Following a bench trial, defendant, Antoine Hardman, was convicted of one count ofpossessing between 1 and 15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of aschool.
On June 15, 2016, the circuit court of Cook County entered an order of adjudication of direct civil contempt against contemnor, Amy P. Campanelli, the Cook County public defender, and sanctioned Campanelli $250 per day until she purged herself of direct civil contempt or was otherwise discharged by due process of law.
The defendant, Michael Brooks, was charged with driving under the influence following asingle-vehicle motorcycle accident. He filed a motion to suppress the results of blood-alcoholtesting on the ground that the blood draw performed at the hospital after his accident was a governmental search conducted in violation of the fourth amendment.
In this case, the trial court permitted the respondent to remain shackled during a hearing on the States petition seeking to administer psychotropic medication involuntarily. The trial court granted the States petition.
In these consolidated appeals we consider the temporal reach of two legislative enactments: (1) an amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2016)), which, inter alia, eliminated armed robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm from the list of automatic transfer offenses, and (2) the new juvenile sentencing provisions codified in section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)), which, inter alia, give the trial court discretion not to impose otherwise mandatory firearm sentencing enhancements.
In this case, we consider whether the relation back statute (735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2010)) applies to a wrongful death claim when the death occurs more than four years after the alleged act of negligence.
Plaintiff Ramsey Herndon LLC sued defendant, Lisa Whiteside (formerly known as LisaE. Luchtefeld), doing business as Beam Oil Company, for breach of contract and conversionbecause defendant refused to pay plaintiff royalties arising from an oil and gas lease.
At issue is whether fees that have already been earned by an attorney in a dissolution of marriage proceeding are considered available funds, such that they may be disgorged under section 501(c-1)(3) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS5/501(c-1)(3) (West 2014)). We hold that earned fees are not subject to disgorgement.